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Attachments	
  and	
  associated	
  reasons	
  
Joseph	
  Raz	
  

Over the years we form attachments and lose them - if ‘lose’ is the right word.
Much of our emotional life revolves around them, is focussed on them. The very
term ‘attachment’ connotes an emotional connection, and I am using the term in a
common, non-technical way. It is not confined to any specific emotion, or range of
emotions, nor is it confined to happy, or willing attachments. There are ones we
have in spite of ourselves. And there are ones we struggle to free ourselves from, or
are ambivalent about. But they are connections we have to people, or objects,
places, or groups of which we are aware. -- I will not be concerned with
attachments to ideas, or theories. To simplify I will not consider complex and
multifaceted attachments, such as religious ones, and will spend more time on
attachments to people than to other objects. -- We may not understand our
attachments well, nor know much about their scope and reach. But we are aware of
their role in our life. Therefore, however anxious we may be to end them, and
however aware we are of their negative aspects, and of the negative emotions they
raise within us, unless we hate ourselves thoroughly we have towards them some
positive feeling, as they are part of who we are and part of our lives.
Given the emotional aspects of attachments it is inevitable that they affect our
concerns, and that means that they affect our perceived reasons, the reasons we
think that we have. My purpose in this paper concerns the proper understanding of
how it can be that our attachments affect the (non-instrumental) reasons we have. I
will neither seek to justify the belief that attachments affect (non-instrumental)
reasons nor endorse beliefs about the reasons they constitute or provide. Given the
inevitability of attachments for creatures with our psychological make up justification
1
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does not seem to me needed. But uncritical endorsement of our beliefs about what
reasons they provide would be rash - while often they provide some reasons there
is no general ground to think that we are correct whenever we assume that they
provide this reason or that. For the most part my discussion will not reach the
question of what reasons they provide, being concerned with understanding how it
is that they can provide any reasons.
In many ways my concern merely echoes Barbara Herman’s concern in the paper on
‘Agency, Attachment and Difference’.1 Our approaches may be thought to be
radically different. She, while not meaning her article ‘in the spirit of endless defense
of a favourite system’ (776) is trying to show that attachments are not inconsistent
with Kantian ethics. I, on the other hand, ignore Kantian or any other constructivist
metaethics, and consider the issue on the assumption that practical reasons, that is
reasons for actions, intentions and other attitudes, are given by the value of
performing them, or of having them. Yet, we share an understanding of where the
difficulty lies.
The paper will unfold in 5 parts dealing with five questions: first, does the partiality
of attachments present an obstacle to their being or giving practical reasons?
Second, given a value-based approach to practical reasons, can universal values
generate reasons that are specific to their subjects, reasons – say – towards my
friends that only I have? Third, do attachments affect what we do independently of
any reasons that they provide? Fourth, in what ways do attachments constitute or
provide normative reasons, and briefly, how do attachment-related reasons relate to
other practical reasons? Finally, I turn to the question of the nature of and
justification for partiality to oneself.
1

The	
  Partiality	
  of	
  attachments	
  

1

Barbara Herman, ‘Agency, Attachment, and Difference’, Ethics, vol. 101 (1991) 775
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a

Partiality	
  and	
  pro	
  tanto	
  

Do attachments give one reasons? 'Why not?' you may ask. 'What is the problem?'
Some perceive the difficulty in reconciling the partiality imported by attachments
with the impartiality of morality.2
‘Partiality’ in the sense relevant here designates either an action or a motivational
disposition to favour someone. Favour him compared with what? If the possibility
that partiality may be justified is not to be ruled out by stipulation, the basis of
comparison cannot be ‘favour him more than one should, or more than one may’.
So I will take partiality to be acting or being disposed to act in ways that favour one
person more than others (whether more than some others, or more than all
others), when doing so expresses favourable attitudes and emotions one has
towards that person.
Given the complex emotional aspects of some attachments, and especially given that
they may carry negative emotions, like resentment or anger, they are sometimes
perceived to give rise to reasons that do not favour their objects. Partiality3 implies
a favouring, so the question of how attachments give rise to reasons is wider than
the question of the possibility of justified partiality. There may, however, be special
difficulty with the justification of partiality. Such difficulties also affect matters other
than attachments. Possibly we have reasons to be partial or to act in ways that are

2

One view that I ignore here is that morality consists of those considerations that can be established from the
moral point of view, which is inherently impartial – that is what makes it moral. Constructivists are
committed to something like this. Without a constructivist foundation a point of view is simply a partial view,
defined by what it excludes. If one defines morality as sound reasons other than reasons of partiality then
obviously morality conflicts with reasons of partiality. But being interested in the way sound reasons cohere
there is no point in our attending to such an artificial restriction.

3

According to the Oxford English Dictionary ‘impartiality’ means ‘Not partial; not favouring one party or side
more than another; unprejudiced, unbiased, fair, just, equitable. (Of persons, their conduct, etc.)’. Needless to
say morality does not sanction prejudice, bias or unfair, etc. treatment. So if morality is impartial that must
mean that it does not sanction favouring some people or their conduct, etc. over others.

3
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partial to our relations or to our country or to our employer, whether or not we
are attached to them.
But is there a difficulty about reconciling partiality with morality? There would be if
one thought that reasons which display partiality always override those that do not,
if one thought, for example, that one’s duties to one’s children always override
those owed to strangers. But this supposition is mistaken. Later we may want to
return to the question of what determines the relative force of reasons that do and
those that do not display partiality. Here it is enough to note that reasons displaying
partiality are, like most others, pro tanto reasons. Barbara Herman expresses what is
essentially the same thought as follows:
‘What the Kantian requires is only that he not view his desire to save his wife
as an unconditionally valid reason.’4
As desires are not reasons, I feel that the point is better expressed by saying simply
that even given the agent’s attachment to his wife, the reason to save her is not
necessarily conclusive. It is unconditional and valid, but it may be defeated by
conflicting reasons. Though my way of explaining how it is that reasons that express
partiality are pro tanto differs from Barbara’s, the two ways are fundamentally at one.
She explains:
In the wide range of cases, the role of the Kantian motive of duty is as such a
limiting condition: it expresses the agent’s commitment that he will not act
(on whatever motive, to whatever end), unless his action is morally permitted.
Thus, in the case of bringing aid to someone in need, it would be quite
ordinary for the action of the normal moral agent to be overdetermined5: he
might act from the emotion-based desire to help (meeting the other’s need
would thus be the direct object of his action), and he would act from the
motive of duty (the permissibility of what he was doing would be a necessary
condition of his acting to help).6

4

Barbara Herman, ‘Integrity and Impartiality’, The Monist, 66 (1983) 234 at 246.

5

In commenting on the passage I will ignore its description of the situation described as one of overdetermination. That idea implies two independent routes, each one sufficient in itself for the same outcome.
But that is not what Barbara has in mind. She describes a situation in which two components generate an
outcome, each being necessary and neither of them sufficient to bring it about.
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Barbara Herman, ‘Integrity and Impartiality’, The Monist, 66 (1983) 234 at 236.
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Here is how I see the case: in acting to help a person in need for a reason that
expresses the agent’s feeling for the other the agent at least implicitly endorses the
view that the reasons for his or her action are not defeated by conflicting reasons.
As you see I am avoiding here the question of what actually motivates, i.e. causally
explains the action – a matter to be dealt with later – and most significantly I do not
suggest that the agent acts from a motive or reason of duty. It is merely that he or
she would not have acted as they did if they thought that the reason for the action is
defeated. That is, of course, not a point about their moral dispositions. It merely
expresses the fact that the action is not irrational, not akratic, the agents are not
acting against their better judgement. Whether this aspect of the nature of rational
intentional action gives succour to the Kantians is not for me to judge. It does,
however, help remove some suspicion about the relations between reasons that
express partiality or attachment and moral concerns. Barbara observes:
[E]ven when morality permits mothers to act for their children first among
others … I do not act for my child because morality permits it, but because I
am his mother.7
Well, yes and no. The mother is acting because of both facts, in that she would not
have acted if the reasons for the action were defeated by moral reasons against it.8
But things being as they are, the fact that there are no decisive moral reasons against
the action is not and cannot be her reason for the action: the absence of a reason is
not a reason. The only reason for her action is the undefeated reason to act for her
child.
b

Partiality	
  and	
  moral	
  impartiality	
  

Given that reasons, actions for which expresses partiality, are merely pro tanto, are
they suspect in any way at all? Perhaps the difficulty is in the claim that morality is
impartial. Barbara thinks that impartiality consists in observing the maxim that

7

Barbara Herman, ‘Agency, Attachment, and Difference’, Ethics, vol. 101 (1991) 775 at 780

8

It is worth noting that if moral reasons are a distinctive set of reasons they may militate against the action
without defeating the reasons of partiality or attachment for it.
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enjoins people to treat like cases alike.9 However, she believes, as I do, that that
requirement is empty.10 I will dismiss the pedantic observation that since all cases
are alike in some respects and different in others the maxim requires one to treat all
cases in the same way, but that is an empty requirement because all modes of
treatment are likewise alike in some ways (while being different in others). It seems
natural to understand the maxim as requiring one to treat alike cases that are alike
in that the same reasons for action apply to them. So understood the maxim avoids
the pedantic objection. But so understood the maxim does no more than enjoin us
to act for reasons that apply to us. We need no maxim for that to be true of us.
That follows from the very idea that reasons apply to us. Therefore, unlike Barbara,
I do not see the rejection of the maxim as a challenge to the claim that morality is
impartial, as I do not think that the maxim is about impartiality. Being empty it is not
about anything.
Partiality, to repeat, is favouring. It is possible that one has reasons to favour one
person over another. But do such reasons conflict with morality? No doubt, we
should be impartial or act impartially in some contexts, and sometimes that would
involve a conflict with reasons believed to be generated by our attachments. A
teacher whose daughter is one of the children in his class should act impartially
towards all his students, and that may be difficult. There would be occasions in
which one should avoid being in a situation in which these difficulties are
encountered. But is morality impartial in the stronger sense, meaning that all moral
reasons are impartial?
It is a difficult question as well as an easy one. Given that there is no theoretically
significant body of considerations that constitutes morality one may, as we inevitably
do, draw the boundaries of morality in different ways on different occasions, and
none of these ways has claim to be the correct one. So, for example, some may

9

Op. Cit. 776.
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There are other ways of understanding it, some making it too weak, others too strong. They cannot be
considered here.
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conclude that duties to one's children, demanding partiality towards one's children,
are not moral duties, though (they may say) they are valid, binding duties. Others
may take them to be moral and interpret or qualify the thesis that morality is
impartial to allow for that kind of partiality. Such disputes about the nature or
boundaries of morality seem to me pointless.
It is worth examining, however, one way of reconciling reasons of partiality with
the alleged impartiality of morality. According to it considerations that permit or
require agents to be partial are moral if derived from, or grounded in considerations
that are impartial. For example, it may be claimed that
(1) Favouring one's children is (a constitutive) part of, or contributes to, a
parent-child relationship that is valuable or good.
(2) The value of that relationship yields a reason for parents to favour their
children.
Therefore
(3) One has reasons to favour one's children
The argument from (1) to (3) seems to me sound and helpful. I will refer to it as the
standard argument. It points to the way reasons that express partiality can be
established. But does the standard argument show that the more basic moral
considerations are impartial? It is claimed that the standard argument entails:
(4) The reason all parents have to favour their children is itself impartial.
But does it? (1) and (2) are about the value of a type of relationship rather than
about partiality or impartiality. The reason asserted in (3) is universal, in that it
applies to anyone who is a parent. But it simply calls for partiality to be displayed by
all. If partiality has something to do with agents showing favour to some over others
and if reasons of partiality are reasons for conduct that favours some over others
then (3) states that all parents have reason to be partial. There is nothing impartial
about it (the proposition itself is not impartial as propositions can no more be
impartial than partial).

7

c

Partiality	
  and	
  the	
  value	
  of	
  persons	
  

Could it be that some writers think that morality is impartial because morally all
people count, they have value as people, because they are people? And therefore no
one is more valuable than any other? It is not easy to know what to make of this
proposition. The value of people as people is a reason to respect them. It does not
follow that I should respect my grandmother or that I should respect a great
novelist just as much as I should respect a complete stranger who accomplished
little in his life. I should respect all of them equally as persons, but not as great
artists or as my grandmothers. How much should I respect each of them all told?
Respect does not always aggregate, but sometimes the reasons for respect that I
have towards some people would require me to do more for them than for the
others. By way of contrast we can expect that in some other contexts the
cumulative strength or importance of reasons to respect some people will not be
greater than the strength or importance of the most important of these reasons. So
that taken together, so long as the strongest reason applies to each of the people,
they will yield reasons for the same conduct regarding each of them.
Some may object that I have misrepresented the principle that all persons count and
count equally. It is not to be understood as saying that apart from their other
evaluative properties: being (or not being) beautiful, generous, wise, conscientious,
and the like, people also have value simply in virtue of being persons. Rather the
principle states that persons enjoy a special status, that of beings that count.
How does that differ from saying that they possess worth in virtue of being persons,
as well as worth in virtue of being creative, funny and the like? Is it that having this
moral status is a precondition to be met before any of the other value properties
can apply to them? This may be true of some properties. One cannot be a good
mathematician without being a person, for example. But there are beautiful, loving,
creative and funny animals that are not persons. Could it mean that even though
non-persons can have those evaluative properties they do not provide reasons for
actions relating to them because they are not persons? I see no justification for such
8

a view, and will continue on the assumption that the value-based approach is so far
intact.
The preferential treatment respect may require is not normally thought of as
favouring. ‘Favouring’ connotes action out of a special favourable attitude to the
person or object favoured. We may have such an attitude towards people or
objects we have reason to respect, but the reason to respect them is typically
independent of the attitude. The doubts about the moral permissibility of favouring
actions arise when we act as we do because we favour the objects of our actions.
Our attitude is somehow taken to give us a reason to act as we do.
This last point may suggest another source of unease about attachments and
favouring. Favouring someone because he is my son appears to fail the test of
universalizability, because an essential part of the reason can only be stated using a
singular reference. Favouring someone for the reason that he is John, or Joseph’s
child, and the like, is favouring them for non-universal properties they have, or for
being a particular individual. Moral reasons, we have been taught, cannot be like that.
Of course when we deal with people we deal with particular people. We often must
identify the individuals whom we have reason to treat one way or another through
the use of singular reference. But when we have reason to deal with them as we do
that is because their case falls under a reason whose content can be stated without
the use of singular reference.
The obvious reply is to invoke again the standard argument –
(3) One has reasons to favour one's children
because
(1) Favouring one's children is part of, or contributes to, a parent-child relationship
that is valuable or good.
(2) The value of that relationship yields a reason for parents to favour their children.
That NR is my child is a reason for me to favour him because this is an instance of a
reason, namely that parents have reason to favour their children.
2

Personal	
  value:	
  the	
  irreplaceability	
  problem	
  
9

The standard argument shows that the partiality of attachments is not in itself
suspect. It raises no doubts about their ability to provide reasons. But it leads us
straight into the real problem. Barbara states it thus:
When I attend specially to the needs of my children and friends because I am
partial to them, either I have acted as I ought not (morality requires that I
count their needs no more than others’), or I have done what I ought to do,
because there are obligations to one’s children and friends, but I have done it
the wrong way: my actions were expressions of my partiality, not of my moral
understanding and commitments. (776)
We can dismiss the first horn of the dilema. Morality does not forbid us to favour
our children and friends, or so I – along with Barbara – shall assume, meaning that
while some forms of favouring are immoral, not all are. The difficulty is
understanding how it can be right to express our partiality not as an instance of
doing our “moral” duty.
At least part of the problem is with the way the standard argument was presented.
It seems to explain the value of – say - parental relationships. That value provides
reasons for everyone, not only to parents and children. For example, strangers
should respect the relations between parents and children. Sometimes, when the
relationship is in trouble they should help parents and children repair the ruptures.
Governments should help people sustain close relations with their children, and so
on.
The standard argument can explain how the value of an attachment provides
universal reasons of these kinds. But can it explain, e.g., the value of a friendship to
the friends? Assume that the friendship between Abby and Betty is good for both of
them. Values being universal, the objection goes, it follows that there can be
someone else, call her Carol, such that if Abby were friends with her their friendship
would have the value to Abby that her friendship with Betty has. In that case, Abby
has no reason not to replace her friendship with Betty with a friendship with Carol,
assuming that she can do so. But that is clearly false, and it shows that universal
values cannot account for the value or practical importance of relationships and
attachments. It follows that universal values cannot explain the reasons attachments
10

give to those attached. Friendships, one is inclined to say, are with a particular
person, not with the bearer of some good qualities. For Abby her friendship is with
Betty – with that individual person, not merely Betty as a bearer of some good
qualities that Carol may also have, or come to have.
It is not easy to make sense of the objection. Of course the friendship is with a
specific individual, but Abby cannot even recognise her friend except through some
of her features, features that may well be shared by others. All her beliefs about her
friend, everything she feels her friend to be or have, can be expressed as ascribing to
her friend some properties that can (in an a-temporal sense) be possessed by other
people. Perhaps the objection is that it is wrong to think that the significance of the
friendship for Abby is exclusively in Betty’s good qualities. She may like Betty
because of her awkward gait, her bent legs, her infuriating contrariness, etc. To be
sure, people’s affection for others, and whatever dependence on them evolves
through their common history, does consist of reactions to features that are not
themselves evaluative, and not necessarily commonly seen as endearing.11 But if the
friendship is good, and if the affection and mutual dependence contribute to its
significance, then those features are themselves good in one way or another.
It is time to address directly the issues of uniqueness and non-fungibility. Our
friendships and other attachments are unique to us. That, however, is consistent
with the fact that they are made unique by universal properties. It may be that for
Abby her friendship with Betty is special because it was with Betty she had her first
satisfying sexual experience, or because it was Betty who nursed her back to health
when she had pneumonia, the first serious illness of her life, etc. In each case what
makes Betty special and important to Abby is that she relates to her in a way in
which many people can relate to one another. Many people were someone’s first
satisfying sexual partner, many people nursed someone to health from their first
serious illness, and many others could have played these roles. Nevertheless, so far
11

A non-evaluative property may be said to be positive if its presence contributes to the explanation of the fact
that a good-making evaluative property is instantiated in the conditions then existing.
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as Abby is concerned Betty is unique. She relates to Abby in ways in which now no
one else can. And these relational properties are, to Abby, significant. They are part
of what makes her friendship with Betty unique, and uniquely valuable.
That means that no other friendship will be the same, will have the same good
aspects as the friendship with Betty. It does not mean either that that friendship is
the best there can be, or that it would be wrong to end it in order to have another
friendship, when the two conflict.
I have illustrated the point using the example of dramatic events in people’s lives.
Many friendships and other attachments do not share such dramatic events, and for
those who share them such events need not be the most important aspect of the
meaning of the friendship. With time more and more is shared among people, and
some of it becomes – for one reason or another, and they need not be important
reasons – significant for them, changing, cementing or undermining the ties among
the friends. Uniqueness is created by the significant historical-biographical features of
the friendship. And the role of all the significant historical features of a friendship or
other attachment, is explained by theories that fall within the value-based approach.
The objector may reply that while it is true that such historical properties make the
relationship unique to the friends, and while they may be valuable properties, they
are not the reasons people have for valuing their friendships, at least they are not
always among the reasons people have for valuing the friendship. That may be so.
The observations above address the familiar tension between the feeling that
attachments are valuable because of the evaluative properties that they or their
objects have, and the feeling that each attachment is in some sense unique and
irreplaceable – we can lose one attachment and acquire others that are no less good
and enriching, but they will be different. In some significant dimension we will not be
replacing like with like. We may, for example, while conceding that the new
attachment is no less valuable than the lost one, and that it enriches our life no less
than the lost one did, nevertheless mourn the loss of the lost one (and not merely
the circumstances of its loss).
12

My view of the matter as outlined above is almost entirely consonant with Barbara’s
deliberative field model which defeats ‘a picture of an autarchy of ends slotted into a
legalistic or merely formal deliberative framework and, ... [replaces] that picture
with the idea of the Good as a constructed object of practical agency’,12 replaces it
with an account of how the attachments are integrated within the agents’ lives. The
main difference between us is the absence from my account of a constructivist
understanding of that process, an understanding that implies that the value of the
attachment is entirely due to (a) its being embraced by the agent and (b) its not
falling foul of moral constraints. On my account, expressed in the standard
argument, the attachment has to be valuable and its objects appropriate
independently of the agents’ embracing them. However, they acquire a personal
meaning or value to these agents through their biographical place in in the agents’
lives and that, those biographical properties of the objects of attachments, makes
them unique to the agents, in a way that is consistent with the universalisability of
value properties, because there could be similar attachments in the life of other
people.13
3

Attachments	
  and	
  the	
  right	
  reasons	
  

The conclusion of the discussion so far is that if there is any puzzle about the
possibility of reasons that express attachments it is not because they favour some
over others, and therefore not because they express partiality to some over others.
Such partiality and such favouring are not always defensible, but they are not suspect
12

Op. Cit., 788

13

Another difference between us is that I do not share Herman’s view that there is a problem with the plural
value view. She writes that the ‘problem arises when it looks like “over here” is what I most care about, what
I want to happen (and cannot not want to happen), but “over there” is what impartial morality demands.
There is then deep conflict and tension. And when impartial morality wins, it is not only at the expense of
what I most care about, it provides no deliberative space even to acknowledge my concerns. The fact that I
care about my son is in no way to affect the deliberative outcome.’ (783). It is part of growing up to realise
that some things are not up to us, and they can be the weather, other people’s behaviour or our moral
duties.
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in themselves. When vindicated, the standard argument shows them to be valuable
because they are instances of universal values that have acquired a special
significance in the life of the people whose attachments they are. I will therefore
now return to an examination of attachments only. The puzzle about them (though
not only about them) is that the standard argument that establishes which
attachments are valuable seems ill suited to provide the reasons that those
attachments appear to provide.
To begin we should examine the ways in which attachments affect our reasons. I will
consider only one type of attachment, though a large and varied type: friendship.
The problem we face now is how to understand personal meaning or value, and
how it affects the reasons we have.
a

Incommensurability	
  of	
  reasons	
  and	
  the	
  impact	
  of	
  feelings	
  &	
  attitudes	
  

Two broad situations present different problems. In the first one acts to cultivate a
new friendship or to enhance the significance of an existing one, or one acts to
protect an existing friendship from ending, or deteriorating. In the second
friendships exist that do not need repairing, enhancing or defending. The first
category involves actions for the sake of the friendship, whereas the second does
not. There when actions affect the friends one can be said to be acting out of
friendship, one is acting as a friend.
Let me start with a story. Suppose you ask me about Jack: Isn’t he an interesting
person? Good natured? Fun to be with? A good and loyal friend (to his friends)? I
agree with all of that. ‘Why don’t you befriend him?’ You ask. ‘I don’t know. I just
don’t feel like it’, I reply. About a week later you ask me about Jill, and it turns out
that I have the same positive opinion about her. ‘How about befriending Jill?’ you
ask. ‘Interesting suggestion’, I say, ‘I had not thought of it; but now you mention it I
think that I will try to become friends with her’. ‘Why do you want to be friends
with Jill?’ you ask. ‘You know’, I say, ‘she is interesting, and easy to get on with, etc.
etc.’ ‘But so is Jack’ you say. ‘I know, but I just do not feel like being friends with
him’. ‘Do you mean’, you ask, ‘that you like Jill better than Jack?’ ‘No,’ I reply, ‘I like
14

them both’. ‘Do you suspect’, you ask ‘that you will be more successful in
establishing a lasting, rewarding friendship with Jill than with Jack?’ ‘No, I have no
reason to think so, nor the opposite’. ‘So why?’ you finally ask. ‘I do not know. I just
want to’.
I do not suggest that this is a typical story. Often, probably most often, people drift
into friendship gradually, not deciding to form a new friendship deliberately as in the
story. Nor, when aiming to forge a new friendship, do people typically act in the way
the story describes. It is, however, a possible story, and it brings out an important
point, a point that is typically present in all deliberate forging of new friendships. It is
that people have reasons for their choice of friends, but those reasons are not
unique to the people they choose to be friends with, nor do they fully explain their
choice of friends. Typically, they just go for one person and not for another. There
are no normative reasons for the preference, though of course there are
psychological or other explanations, or if you like, non-normative explanatory
reasons.
Another story illustrates the point: It starts the same way, with that conversation
about Jack, except that when we meet again you do not mention Jill. Instead I tell
you that I changed my mind and I am now trying to forge a friendship with Jack.
‘Why?’ you ask. ‘Well as we said, he has so many good qualities one wants to see in
a friend’. ‘But’, you say, ‘that was not enough for you last week’. ‘Well’, I reply, ‘I
changed my mind’. ‘Have you learnt anything new about Jack?’ ‘No, it is simply that
now I feel like being friends with him’.
It is about the same point: I have reasons, but the complete explanation involves
more than those reasons. Similar phenomena will be familiar when friends drift apart
imperceptibly, until the friendship ends. There are many different ways of drifting
apart – sometimes the reasons for the friendship disappear or there are new
reasons against it. But sometimes the reasons for the friendship are still there, but
the friendship lost its appeal.

15

Let us turn now to actions within a secure friendship: often people like being with
their friends, doing things with them as well as doing things for them. In all these
cases what they do are things worth doing and worth doing with someone, whether
or not one does them with one’s friends. Social intercourse, going on holidays, going
to concerts, dances, discussing philosophy, supporting another person materially or
psychologically, lending a listening ear, offering sound advice, and so on are all worth
while in their own right. In many cases agents have reason to spend time with, do
something with or for their friends, and they also have reason to do the same, or to
engage in other activities, with others. Often the reasons for none of these various
options defeat the others.14 In some such cases agents will feel disinclined to, and
will not choose the option of acting with or for their friends. Sometimes I prefer not
to be even with my best friends, and would rather be with people who are not
among my friends. And I do not mean just that sometimes the better reason would
support such options. I mean simply that faced with incommensurable reasons, and
feeling at that time as I do, I would choose an option not involving my friends.
By the same token, on other occasions people will prefer, again faced with
incommensurable reasons, those options that do involve their friends. Suppose Jill is
now a friend. I may feel like spending time with her, doing something with her. Not
because she is a friend, but because she is Jill, though I would not have felt like that
had she not been my friend.
So far I have emphasised a number of ways in which friendship may be at work, but
not as a normative reason. Rather, the web of feelings and attitudes that constitute
its instantiation in this person or that causes people to act intentionally, that is for
reasons, but the reasons do not involve the friendship, and do not fully explain the
action. The feelings and attitudes associated with the friendship complement the
normative explanation of the action, and it is they that account for the choice to be
or act with the friend.

14

See my discussion of incommensurability of reasons in The Morality of Freedom, chapter 13.
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b

Friendship	
  as	
  a	
  reason	
  

You may think that in detailing some ways in which attachments can affect our
conduct even when they do not feature among the normative reasons for which we
act I am trying to minimise the difficulty of explaining how the value of friendship can
be a reason for action out of friendship. But my aim is not that, but the need to
identify the kind of situations in which attachments, friendships, not only affect our
conduct but do so because we act for (normative) reasons, which they constitute. I
described two kinds of situations in which our actions are explained by our
friendships but where the friendships do not figure among the (normative) reasons
for which we act. First, when we act for reasons, but the reasons are not conclusive.
They are incommensurable with conflicting reasons, and what makes us choose the
option we do are our feelings and attitudes about and to the friendship and the
friend, feelings and attitudes that explain our actions without being our reasons for
them. Second, there are cases in which we want to do things with or for the person
who is a friend but our reason is that he or she is that person: I want to do things
with or for Jill, because I take pleasure in doing things with or for her. Not because
she is a friend, but because she is Jill. Possibly, I would have felt the same had she
not been a friend. As things are, our friendship explains why I feel that way. But that
is not part of my (normative) reason. Some of these cases are also cases of
incommensurability. But they include cases where the reasons to act with or for the
friend are conclusive.
When do friendships constitute or provide normative reasons? Some cases are
unproblematic. For example, having moved to a new town in which I know nobody,
I may set out to spot possible friends and cultivate relations with them. My reason is
the value, the benefits, which a successful friendship will bring. Similarly, even though
I am not entirely happy with my friendship with Jack, given that he is my only friend I
may try to repair ruptures in the friendship in order to keep it alive, for the sake of
the value it has for me. Some reasons of this kind are frowned upon as mercenary
(forging a friendship with someone one dislikes to gain promotion at work, etc.). But
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they are not all objectionable. However, they do not exhaust the ways attachments
provide reasons. The other ways are the problematic ones.
Even when one’s action is not taken for the reason that it is directed towards a
friend, even when it is merely caused by feelings and attitudes associated with
friendship, it does express the agent’s friendship with the other. That an action
expresses friendship does not mean that it was taken to express friendship. But that
an action would, if taken, express one’s friendship makes it possible to take it in
order to express the friendship, an act that can reinforce the friendship and reassure
the friends of their continued closeness.
Moreover, friendship like other attachments is a socially constituted relationship, or
rather a range of relationships, as there are so many kinds of socially recognised
friendships. To be sure, people mould their friendships to suit their circumstances,
feelings and temperaments. But their shaping of their relationships constitutes mere
variations on socially recognised themes. That is inescapable with all “dense” social
relations, ones involving a wide range of complex interactions and mutual
expectations. Their density means that they cannot be entirely created by the
people involved in them. Rather the people know the social form, and rely on it
while adapting it.15
It is typical of the social practices that create the possibility of various relationships
that they endow some actions with symbolic meaning relevant to the conduct of
such a relationship: they signify a desire to form it, express a commitment to its
continuation, show the degree to which one finds it important, that one desires to
reduce its intensity or to end it, that one feels that the other has failed to live up to
its requirements, and so on. These actions sometimes express their meaning
whether intended to do so or not, but typically they will be performed to express
their meaning – and such actions are actions where the relationship, the friendship
in our example, provides a reason, or part of the reason for the action. Valuing as
15

I discussed this matter in some detail in The Morality of Freedom ch. 12.
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we do our friendships, caring about them, and about our friends, it is natural that we
have reason to express these facts, not only to reassure our friends, but out of the
need to express how we feel, to make plain or reaffirm how we feel.
But even though much of what we do within a friendship has that expressive value,
and can, and often is, done partly to express our attitudes to our friends and
friendships, this is not yet the central case, nor perhaps the most troublesome case.
The key to the way in which friendships give reasons lies in the fact that they are
social products: constituted by complex interweaving practices. They determine
what conduct is or is not appropriate between friends, and the appropriate ways in
which we recognise and respect friendships among others. As I mentioned the
socially determined patterns of conduct and expectations are malleable, and adapted
by people in building their own friendships (though the degree to which deviation
from the socially determined factors is permissible varies among societies). But even
the private, individual shaping of one’s relationships is done against the backdrop of
those social practices. They form the point of departure, the baseline that endows
variations with their meaning by the very fact that they are variations. The
background of social practices is essential. It enables people to know how to
conduct themselves within friendships, and what to expect from their friends.
Now we can see the complex pattern that attachments generate: friends act
towards each other in the knowledge of what is appropriate or expected, and that
of course allows considerable freedom for both the social practices and their
personal modifications to determine types of appropriate actions, allowing various
degrees of freedom in choosing the specific act one would perform. That choice is
informed by any number of other reasons, not necessarily to do with one’s relations
to the friend (people follow their professional or other interests partly commonly
with their friends). The friendship is part of the reason for such action, the part that
says that the action is appropriate in the context of the relationship. Sometimes,
however, one has no other reason for taking the action, nor is one emotionally
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moved to take it. One may even be reluctant to take the action, and take it
unwillingly with various degrees of reserve or resentment, simply because one
knows (or believes) that one owes it to one’s friend.
c

Have	
  we	
  solved	
  the	
  puzzle?	
  

You will remember the puzzle I set out to solve. In Barbara’s words –
When I attend specially to the needs of my children and friends because I am
partial to them, either I have acted as I ought not (morality requires that I
count their needs no more than others’), or I have done what I ought to do,
because there are obligations to one’s children and friends, but I have done it
the wrong way: my actions were expressions of my partiality, not of my moral
understanding and commitments. (776)
Or, for those unworried about the distinctness of moral reasons: If we have reasons
to act with or for our children because of the value of the parent-child relationship,
does it not follow that when acting for reasons which express my attachment to my
children I am acting for invalid reasons? I am not acting to promote the value of
parental relations. I am expressing my partiality, not my adherence to value.
That worry, I implied, is generated by a mistaken view of the way attachments
provide reasons. Attachments provide non-instrumental reasons only when they are
the fostering of a valuable relationship. Valuable relationships consist in dense
patterns of interactions, expectations recognised by those in the relationship and by
others. That means that they are constituted by a web of duties and other practical
reasons, the basic pattern of which is underpinned by social practices that people
are familiar with, and which they modify to suit their personalities and
circumstances. The relationships provide reasons because they are constituted by
those reasons. People act for those reasons because these are the actions that
express the relationships, but they are not necessarily motivated by those reasons.
Typically the reasons are not conclusive; there are other actions supported by
reasons that are no weaker. Typically, people are motivated by their feelings about
and attitudes towards their children, or friends, etc. But many of the actions so
motivated are also actions taken for reasons of friendship, or of parental relations,
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meaning that those reasons determine what action would express the feelings
friends have towards their friends, or parents towards their children.
That is, however, merely a description of the simple case. Often the reasons and
motivations will be more complicated – one may have reason to reassure the other
of one’s commitment to the relationship; one may feel a need to rekindle in oneself
the emotions that one thinks one ought or one wants to have towards the other;
one may simply be aware that given the relationship one owes this or that to the
other and do so reluctantly --- and the complexity of human life and of human
emotions guarantees an indefinite number of more complex reasons and
motivations.
4

Conflict	
  and	
  aggregation	
  

Some may feel that I have not yet confronted the main difficulty. It is often discussed
through examples: May I save my friend, rather than any of the others, just because
she is my friend? Or suppose that three are at risk, and I can choose between saving
the two on the left and saving the one on the right, and the one is my friend, or my
mother, or child. May I save the one rather than the two, just because of my
attachment to her? Or, indeed, may I not do so? Is it permissible to save the two
rather than my mother?
That possession of other evaluative qualities provides reasons independently of
being a person, does not in itself entail that the strength of the reasons they provide
is greater than the strength of the stronger reason among them. It is possible that
the reason not to kill Jane because she is a person is as strong as the reasons not to
kill her due to the combined facts that she is a gifted musician and a person. But
unless one assumes that none of the other evaluative qualities of persons makes a
difference to way one should conduct oneself towards them the question is one of
detail: a question of when favouring is justified rather than whether it can be (noninstrumentally) justified.
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A value-based account is one according to which reasons are provided by the value
of things, by the fact that certain actions, people, events and more possess value
properties of a variety of kinds. As we saw, evaluative properties are ‘impartial’ in
being universal. Given that being persons endows people with value, in as much as
people count because they are persons they all count just the same. But they
possess other non-instrumental value properties, and these differentiate between
people. In as much as they differ in their evaluative features we have different
reasons to behave differently to different people.
5

Partiality	
  to	
  oneself	
  

It is frequently assumed that whatever one’s verdict about other partialities,
partiality to oneself must be justified for it is inevitable, or rather it can be avoided
only by suppressing powerful natural motivational dispositions, and by distorting
one’s existence as an agent. I believe that partiality to oneself is never justified and
that it is often thought to be justified because it is confused with agential asymmetry.
As this is an important point I will take some time to explain it.
Every person is both the agent of his own actions, and in some cases, one of their
objects, one of those affected by them. Other people are merely the objects of his
actions (though joint action is another important category, with mixed roles for
others). That is the obvious, but nonetheless the basic asymmetry. It explains some
of the phenomena that are often mistaken for partiality for self. Agents are
sometimes affected by a variety of motivational dispositions a few of which can be
confused with a disposition to be partial to oneself. Take, to start with, the common
belief that people are naturally partial to themselves in that they are liable to choose
the action that, they believe, will better serve their own interest, even when aware
that the alternative is supported by better impartial reasons. It is at best only
partially true, and to the extent that it is, that is for reasons other than those
assumed by those who hold it.
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It is not clear, for example, to what degree serving one’s self-interest shows
partiality to oneself. What is in one’s interest, or self-interest, to do or have is –
normally – that which will secure the means or the preconditions for the realisation
of one’s ends, or will realise a constitutive part or aspect of one’s ends, assuming
that they are worth pursuing.16 Thus it is in one’s interest to have adequate
accommodation, more money, good health, and the like. Some of these would be of
non-instrumental value as well. But it is inappropriate to describe whatever is of
intrinsic value only as being in one’s interest. Listening to a Bach Cantata, listening to
it for no ulterior, no further reason or end, is not something which could properly
said to be in my interest, though having a ticket to its performance is. To say that
listening to it is in my interest implies an ulterior purpose that will be served by
doing so. It may impress my new friend, or it may advance my goal of listening to all
Bach’s Cantatas, etc. Given that actions whose value to their agents is purely
intrinsic are not properly described as being in their interest, we can conclude that
what makes something be in the interest of the agent is not its intrinsic value.
To simplify let us concentrate on those actions that are in the agents’ interest
because they are instrumentally valuable in serving the agents’ (worthwhile) goals.
There is no general reason to think that these goals are or will all be self-regarding,
that they are or will be the pursuit of pleasure by the agent, or the pursuit of
knowledge by him, etc. At least some of them may be other-regarding goals like
looking after one’s children, contributing to political causes, studying to become a
doctor in order to have a socially useful job, etc. Whether or not preferring one’s
interests displays partiality to oneself appears to depend, at least to a degree, on
what one’s goals are. It may do so if the goals are self-regarding, but not otherwise.
Of course, if one’s goals show partiality to one’s children or others, then one’s
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I am putting the point crudely without due qualifications and refinements.
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preference for doing what serves one’s interest, while not manifesting partiality to
oneself, may be infected by partiality to one’s children.17
A disposition to prefer one’s interests does not amount to a disposition to favour
oneself. Possibly, however, action that serves one’s interests may be due to a
different disposition, one that can more properly be described as a disposition to
favour oneself. Agents sometimes have a preference for being active, and for being
in control. Imagine a simplified situation: we can either achieve a certain result by
our own action, or let someone else secure the same result, perhaps getting him to
secure it by paying him to do so. Not infrequently one has a preference for
achieving the result oneself, and such preferences may lead one to take the wrong
action, that is to try to secure the result oneself rather than get someone else to do
so, when the latter would be better. More indirectly, the preference for being in
control may lead to action, sometimes unjustified action, furthering one’s own
interests. As we saw, successfully furthering one’s own interests is empowering. It
enhances one’s ability to achieve one’s goals. But it is important not to confuse the
preference to favour one’s interests which results from a preference for being active
and in control with taking oneself, implicitly or explicitly, as deserving special
favours, or as counting for more than others.
The preference for being in control is but one of the motivational malformations
that may afflict agents. It is paralleled by an opposite preference, also often to be
found, namely the preference to avoid responsibility, a preference for not being in
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Here another complication comes into play. Reference to interest is at home when the action supposed to
be in one’s interest either serves a self-regarding end (getting a ticket to the performance of the Bach
cantata) or serves an unspecific end, as most self-interested actions do. These actions serve or will serve
unspecific goals which one has or will come to have: one saves money now to have the means for whatever
one would want to do in 20 years time, etc. That is, when the self-interested action is taken, that it will
advance the end that it will, in the event, serve is not the reason for taking the action. Suppose I borrow a car
to be able to take my child to school. It would be odd to say that it was in my interest to borrow the car.
Though agreeing to have my friend’s car for my own use next week may well be in my interest. I will find
ways to make use of it. Its possession may even lead me to adopt ends I would otherwise not be able (i.e.
rationally able) to adopt.
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charge or in control, but letting others deal with the matter at hand. That
preference, when allowed to dictate one’s choices, will lead one to try to achieve
one’s goals by getting others to do so, rather than doing it oneself. A single person
may well display both conflicting preferences on different occasions, or even at the
same time. Neither of them constitutes favouring oneself, both being simply
examples of the large number of motivational or executive malformations to which
agents are susceptible. The distortions and wrong actions to which these
preferences lead do not necessarily favour the agent. Often enough they affect
agents when choosing between different ways of pursuing moral objectives where
neither option favours the agent. Yet the motivational malformations, either the
preference for being in control, or for avoiding direct involvement and
responsibility, may well determine the agent’s choice. When the choice is between
an option that favours the agent and one that does not, the malformations may well
lead agents to make choices that disfavour them. Thus it would be a mistake to
think of these motivational preferences as dispositions to favour oneself.
Favouring one’s interests and favouring being in control and active can be
colloquially described as displaying partiality to oneself. But they do not show the
ethically interesting or suspect partiality. What exactly is the ethically suspect or
interesting partiality to oneself? One obvious answer identifies this partiality with
favouring the advancement of one’s own well-being over other ends that, on the
relevant occasion, one believes oneself to have a better reason to pursue. I have
argued that normally, advancing or safeguarding one’s own well-being is not a reason
for the agent concerned.18 But partiality to oneself need not manifest itself in giving
undue weight to an alleged reason to serve one’s own well-being. It could consist
simply in choosing an option that favours one’s well-being when whatever reasons
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support that option are defeated by reasons for an alternative and incompatible
one.19
If so then partiality to self has to be treated as a motivational malformation. But why
assume that it is unjustified? Why not assume that one should, or may, be partial to
oneself? Because that way of understanding the partiality is inconsistent with the
combination of (a) the view that agents do not have a reason to promote their own
well-being, and (b) the view that partiality to self consists in favouring one’s own
well-being. Without rehearsing the full argument for (a) it may be helpful to lift the
veil and look at its main presupposition, which is that our well-being consists in the
whole-hearted and successful pursuit of worthwhile ends – to repeat the sound bite
I repeated many times before. One’s well-being may consist in alleviating poverty,
treating the ill, defending the oppressed, just as it may consist in going on wine
tasting holidays, textile tours of South-West China, or other self-regarding activities
and pursuits. It all depends on what one’s goals are.
The result is that one cannot choose one’s non-instrumental goals to serve one’s
well-being. Rather one chooses one’s goals for their merit, in light of one’s tastes
and inclinations, and they determine what one’s well-being consists in and thereby
also what serves it, what is in one’s interest. It also follows that partiality to self,
understood as favouring one’s own well-being, need not mean preferring selfregarding activities and goals over other, e.g., over moral goals. Whether it does
depends on each person’s ends in life.
Perhaps we should understand partiality to self as a tendency to favour selfregarding ends. For all I know some people may well have such a tendency. But I do
not know of an account that suggests that such a tendency may be justified. Nor do I
know of an account that gives such a tendency the appearance of plausibility which
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Alternatively the partiality could be action taken because one falsely believes that one has a reason to pursue
one’s well-being. Such false belief does not itself manifest any partiality. Mistakes manifest partiality only when
they are the result of partiality, that is if they are caused by one’s partiality. And that brings us back to the
considerations discussed in the text above.
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would warrant attributing belief in its justification to anyone. There are, no doubt,
other possible ways of understanding partiality to self. It may, for example, be a
tendency to keep with the pursuit of one’s well-established ends, rather than deviate
from them when weighty considerations point to an overriding case for doing so. A
person settled in his work, with his family and other pursuits, may well not respond
to the need to help others afflicted by an earthquake or a flood, or whose plight is
not sudden but is now pressed upon him. So understood partiality to self becomes a
conservative tendency, a tendency to stay with the familiar, a disinclination to
change course when there is good reason to do so. Yet again, such a tendency is
probably fairly wide-spread, and yet again it need not lead to action that favours
one’s well-being. A doctor looking after AIDs patients in Uganda may feel the same
reluctance to disrupt his moral activities in order to improve his education, or in
order to keep up a romantic relationship with someone back home, in Denmark,
even though his contribution to his patients in Uganda is now minimal and the better
reason is to take the more self-regarding options. As with other ways of
understanding the so-called partiality to oneself, it is more appropriately understood
as an agential distortion, as motivational malformation.
Some writings express the fear that unless there are limits to the demands of
morality one’s life as an agent is cramped and distorted. One is merely a device for
converting moral inputs into moral output, and one does not have a life one can call
one’s own. A certain partiality to self is a consequence of the fact that ‘concerns and
commitments are naturally generated from a person’s point of view quite
independently of the weight of those concerns in an impersonal ranking of overall
states of affairs’.20 This is a way of understanding Bernard Williams’ integrity
objection and it may well constitute a valid objection to some moral theories. But it
does not justify partiality to self. Our concerns and commitments do arise out of the
belief that they are valuable, and drives and desires which are entirely ‘natural’ and
20
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not sensitive to our view of what reason there may be (e.g. hunger, urge to move
one’s limbs, need to be alert to one’s environment) are rational, for while they are
not as sensitive to reasons as our appreciation of literature, their biological sources
and role mean that there are reasons to satisfy them.
I conclude that the phenomena normally identified as partiality to self are
motivational biases, and I assume that there are various kinds of them, and that they
do not necessarily manifest themselves in choices that favour the agent’s own wellbeing, nor are they due to belief that one counts more than others do.21
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Though confused people may think that they presuppose belief that one counts for more than others.
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